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Abstract
■ Inhibiting inappropriate action is key to human behavioral
control. Studies of action inhibition largely investigated external
stop signals, yet these are rare in everyday life. Instead healthy
adults exert “self-control,” implying an ability to decide inter-
nally to stop actions. We added “choose for yourself” stimuli
to a conventional go/no-go task to compare reactive versus in-
tentional action and inhibition. No-go reactions showed the N2
EEG potential characteristic of inhibiting prepotent motor re-
sponses, whereas go reactions did not. Interestingly, the N2
component was present for intentional choices both to act
and also to inhibit. Thus, free choices involved a first step of
intentionally inhibiting prepotent responses before generating
or withholding an action. Intentional inhibition has a crucial
role breaking the flow of stimulus-driven responding, allowing
expression of volitional decisions. Even decisions to initiate self-
generated actions require this prior negative form of volition,
ensuring the “freedom from immediacy” characteristic of hu-
man behavior. ■
INTRODUCTION
Healthy human adults are thought to exert volitional con-
trol over their own actions. The flexibility and reasons-
responsiveness of voluntary action is a remarkable prod-
uct of brain evolution and development. It underlies the
notion of responsibility and is thus a necessary precursor
of social living. Earlier neuroscientific work on volition fo-
cused on the conscious experience of initiating action
(Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), but recent studies
emphasize instead the inhibitory elements of volition,
linking it to self-control. Self-control involves the capacity
to inhibit an action despite strong internal urges or exter-
nal cues to act (Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012). Ani-
mals that lack this capacity are effectively prisoners of
their immediate environment (Shadlen & Gold, 2004).
Prepotent responses to immediate stimuli may need to
be suppressed in order to achieve other goals, to con-
serve energy, to prevent harmful side effects of action,
or to achieve greater benefits at a later date.
Self-control, therefore, implies the capacity for volun-
tarily inhibiting motor output. An important neurological
model of self-control comes from utilization behaviors
in patients with frontal damage (Boccardi, Della Salla,
Motto, & Spinnler, 2002; Lhermitte, 1983). These patients
show an inability to suppress stimulus-driven actions af-
forded by their immediate environment. The presence of
a glass on the table compels them to drink, even when
they are not thirsty. In the dramatic example of unilateral
“anarchic hand” (Kritikos, Breen, & Mattingley, 2005;
Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991), the unsuppressed
stimulus-driven actions of the affected hand interfere with
their ability to achieve voluntary action goals with the
unaffected hand (McBride, Sumner, Jackson, Bajaj, &
Husain, 2013).
Some forms of self-control are tonic. For example, the
decision to refrain from using an addictive drug must be
maintained over a long period (Bjork & Gilman, 2013).
However, even tonic self-control ultimately involves the
ability to inhibit urges “in the moment,” implying a tran-
sient suppression or braking of prepotent action plans.
Developmental studies of self-control in healthy children
(Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972) show that inhibiting a
rewarding stimulus-driven action, such as eating marsh-
mallows, ultimately reduces to stopping the movement
of the hand toward the plate. Many people recognize
the feeling of “just stopping oneself at the last moment,”
for example, from saying an unkind word to a colleague.
We use the term intentional inhibition to refer to such
volitional braking of a prepotent action on the brink of
execution (Filevich et al., 2012; Kühn, Haggard, & Brass,
2009; Brass & Haggard, 2007).
Go/no-go tasks offer a standard experimental paradigm
for studying inhibition, although they may not capture
the full capacity for self-control. When a go stimulus is
sufficiently frequent, the action is said to be prepotent,
and occasional no-go stimuli then require effortful inhibi-
tion of the motor response. ERP studies identified an N2
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component, occurring approximately 200 msec after
no-go stimuli, that was stronger than the corresponding
component following go stimuli (Pfefferbaum, Ford,
Weller, & Kopell, 1985). The N2 has been proposed as
a neural marker of motor inhibition (Bokura, Yamaguchi,
& Kobayashi, 2001; Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein,
1999; Eimer, 1993; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985), but others
have suggested that it could reflect conflict between
more and less frequent responses or effortful switch-
ing to a less common response (Randall & Smith, 2011;
Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, Pantev, & Huster, 2010;
Smith, Smith, Provost, & Heathcote, 2010; Donkers &
van Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den
Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003).
We hypothesized that intentional inhibition would also
involve inhibition of a prepotent response and would
therefore evoke a strong no-go N2. We created a novel
task for studying intentional inhibition (see also Parkinson
& Haggard, 2014) by randomly intermixing conventional
go and no-go trials with free choice trials on which par-
ticipants should freely select for themselves whether to
act or inhibit (see Figure 1 for design details). This design
allowed us to factorially compare action and inhibition
for both reactive and intentional responses. To ensure
a prepotent drive to act, reactive go trials were more fre-
quent than other types.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Participants were recruited from an institutional partici-
pant database, were paid £15 for a maximum of 2.5 hr ex-
perimental time, and were tested with local ethical
committee approval. Twenty-one participants were tested
in Experiment 1, and five were rejected on exclusion criteria
detailed in the Procedure section below. For the 16 remain-
ing (nine women), analyzed participants, mean age was
24.6 years (SD= 4.0). Twenty-two participants were tested
in Experiment 2, and six were subsequently rejected. For
the 16 remaining (10 women), analyzed participants, mean
age was 22.7 years (SD = 3.3). All participants who tested
were right-handed by self-report, had noneurological disor-
ders, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure
Experimental Design
The main experiment consisted of 720 trials in total. Par-
ticipants responded to visual target arrows that followed
a fixation cross (see Figure 1 for stimulus representation
and timings). Stimuli were presented using the Psychophys-
ics Toolbox 3 (Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997) in Matlab on a CRT monitor. Participants
were given written instructions, later reiterated verbally by
experimenter JP. They were instructed to prepare a right-
hand index finger button press, beginning prepara-
tion from the onset of each fixation cross, and to press
the button as quickly as possible when they saw the reac-
tive go target (two rightward pointing arrows), within the
706-msec response window. A small gray box appeared to
confirm a successful response, which remained onscreen
for the duration of the response window. If the response
was too slow, the screen flashed red for 100 msec after the
response window to indicate an error. If they saw the reac-
tive no-go target (two leftward pointing arrows), they were
to withhold the prepared response and wait until the re-
sponse window ended. The screen flashed red if they failed
to inhibit.
Figure 1. Stimulus sequences
used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Notice the different percentages
of each trial type in Experiments 1
and 2. Participants used their
dominant (right) hand
throughout, responding using a
single button. Rightward arrows
instructed a go response
(reactive action). Leftward
arrows instructed a no-go
(withhold response; reactive
inhibition). Diamond shapes
indicated free choice trials
(participants freely chose
choice to act or withhold,
corresponding to intentional
action or intentional inhibition).
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Participants were instructed that, if they saw the dia-
mond shape stimulus, they should make an intentional
choice to act or inhibit. Instructions for these trials were
very specific and detailed: Participants were told that
there was no right or wrong answer for these trials and
there was no reward or punishment, nor did the experi-
ment schedule change in any way, as a result of their
choices. They were encouraged to make a quick sponta-
neous choice every time they saw the intentional target,
without deciding in advance what that choice would be.
The speed of the choice was emphasized, as the re-
sponse window was just as fast as in reactive go trials,
and so they were encouraged to not deliberate exces-
sively on the choice. They were encouraged to choose
actions and inhibitions “roughly equally” over the exper-
iment, but without using strategies such as alternation or
counting response numbers. These instructions aimed to
mitigate some of the difficulties previously noted when
studying voluntary choices in a constrained laboratory
setting. Specifically, we wished to allow participants a free
choice in their responses on one hand while avoiding
automatized patterns of responding or predecision on
what free choice to make before the imperative stimulus.
We also needed to constrain “free” choice by the neces-
sity of having enough trials to analyze in each condition.
The instructions presented here represented a compro-
mise between these different demands. The instructions
were repeated verbally by the experimenter JP, who then
confirmed the participant understood.
To minimize muscle-related artifacts in the EEG, partic-
ipants were instructed to refrain from blinking, eye move-
ments, and any other facial movement from the moment
a fixation appeared until the word “BLINK” appeared
onscreen to mark the beginning of a 1-sec blink period
between trials.
In Experiment 1, 360 trials (50%) were reactive go
(rightward arrows), 120 (16%) were reactive no-go (left-
ward arrows), and 240 (34%) were intentional choice trials
(diamond shapes). The proportion of reactive go to no-go
trials was reversed in Experiment 2 (16%/50%), whereas
the proportion of intentional choice trials remained the
same (34%). Both experiments were split into 12 blocks
of 60 trials each with self-timed breaks in between. Partic-
ipants performed one extra block of practice trials before
starting, which were not analyzed. Data acquisition lasted
around 50 min in total.
EEG Measurement
EEG was measured using two 16-channel g.USBamp
amplifiers (g.tec Medical Engineering GmbH, Schiedlberg,
Austria), with active Ag/AgCl electrodes. Twenty-six scalp
electrodes were used corresponding to a sparse 10–
20 map, with the reference taken from the right earlobe.
There were two additional electrodes on the left and
right mastoids for subsequent re-referencing and two
placed above and below the left eye for EOG mea-
surements. Data were recorded at 512 Hz and filtered on-
line with 0.1 Hz high-pass and 100 Hz low-pass hardware
filters, with a notch filter around 50 Hz to remove electri-
cal noise. The EEG recording also incorporated stimulus
trigger markers for fixation, target and blink period onsets,
and button responses.
EEG Preprocessing
All EEG processing was performed in Matlab utilizing the
FieldTrip toolbox (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen,
2011) and the author JP’s custom scripts. Scalp EEG was
re-referenced to linked mastoids, filtered using 0.3 Hz
high-pass and 30 Hz low-pass filters, epoched from
200 msec before target onset (baseline period) to 700 msec
afterwards, and demeaned over the baseline period to target
onset. Upper and lower EOG channels were extracted from
the data set, filtered using 0.5 Hz high-pass and 15 Hz low-
pass two-pass Butterworth filters, and subtracted to create a
single bipolar signal. This was analyzed for eye blink and
movement artifacts exceeding ±70 μV in magnitude. Trials
with artifacts from −100 to +700 msec relative to target
onset were rejected.
Behavioral data were analyzed to detect errors in reac-
tive trials, that is, reactive go trials in which no response
was made within the response window (misses) and re-
active no-go trials in which a response was made (false
alarms). These trials were then removed from analysis.
The remaining EEG trials were classified into four condi-
tions: reactive go, reactive no-go, intentional go, and in-
tentional no-go.
Participant Exclusion Criteria
Participants were excluded for two reasons. First, we
computed the proportion of intentional go trials partici-
pants made within all intentional trials or the intentional
action rate. Participants with intentional action rates less
than 25% or greater than 75% were excluded to try to
insure that no participants had a large bias toward inten-
tional action or inhibition. Second, if a participant pro-
duced fewer than 50 nonerror trials in any condition
(i.e., trials without artifacts or behavioral errors), they
were also rejected. In fact, these two exclusion criteria
tended to be mutually supportive. Five participants in Exper-
iment 1 and six in Experiment 2 were rejected, leaving 16
participants in each experiment. Median RTs for reactive
and intentional go trials were computed for each partici-
pant in each condition in each experiment.
N2 Peak Amplitude Measurement
To identify and measure the N2 components for each
condition, the following procedure was performed in
each participant: For each participant, channel–condition
average EEG waveforms were computed for each channel
(Fz, FCz, Cz; see Experiment 1 Results for justification)
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and condition combination. The N2 component was
identified as the negative peak in each channel–condition
average in the time range 150–300 msec after target onset.
Mean N2 amplitude was calculated for each channel–
condition combination by averaging EEG amplitude in a
window 30 msec either side of each channel–condition
peak. This procedure meant that mean N2 amplitude
measurements were independent of latency differences be-
tween participants, conditions, or channels. The channel–
condition N2 mean amplitudes were then averaged over
the three channels to produce a condition N2 mean ampli-
tude for each condition. These measures were used in the
analyses.
RESULTS
In intentional trials, the mean rate at which participants
freely chose to act was 55.1% (SD = 12.3). Participants
responded more rapidly on reactive go trials (mean =
330 msec, SD = 44.5) than on intentional trials where
they freely selected to act (mean = 402 msec, SD =
60.7; t(15) = 6.04, p < .001). This difference may reflect
a delay associated with intentional choice, even when the
chosen action is motorically identical to the response al-
ready prepared. In go/no-go trials of Experiment 1, errors
of omission averaged 1.9% (SD = 2.2), and errors of
commission averaged 13.9% (SD = 10.0).
Experiment 1: N2 Mean Amplitude
Because the numbers of trials in each condition were
different by design, we avoided bias by analyzing mean
rather than peak ERP amplitudes (see Luck, 2005). The
N2 ERP component was averaged over a group of fron-
tal–central midline electrodes, Fz, FCz, and Cz, commonly
used to measure the N2 component (e.g., Brydges,
Anderson, Reid, & Fox, 2013; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003;
Bokura et al., 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum
et al., 1985; see Methods for details of this calculation).
Figure 2A shows the grand average waveforms for each
condition and mean N2 amplitudes.
The ERP showed a negative-going slope during the
baseline period, presumably reflecting preparation for
the prepotent action. Analysis of N2 mean amplitudes
using an ANOVA with Action source (reactive/intentional)
and Response (act/inhibit) revealed no significant main ef-
fect of Action source (F(1, 15) = 2.81, p = .115), but a sig-
nificant main effect of Response (F(1, 15) = 17.7, p =
.001), and a significant interaction (F(1, 15) = 27.3,
p < .001; Figure 2B). Simple effects t tests showed that
reactive no-go signals produced greater N2 amplitudes
than reactive go signals (t(15) = 6.12, p < .001, differ-
ence 5.1 μV), but intentional action and intentional inhi-
bition had similar N2 amplitudes (t(15) = 0.68, p = .683).
Additional follow-up tests showed that intentional action
and inhibition N2 amplitudes were similar to those for
reactive no-go signals ( p = .181, p = .677 respectively).
Interpreting N2 in Experiment 1: Two Hypotheses
The key finding from Experiment 1 was a strong N2 com-
ponent both for intentional choices to act and for inten-
tional choices to inhibit. When choices were instructed,
in contrast, the N2 component was found only for reac-
tive inhibition. This pattern of interaction sheds impor-
tant light on the structure of intentional choice,
because the N2 component has been associated with
both motor inhibition (e.g., Falkenstein et al., 1999)
and with conflict between alternative responses (e.g.,
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). According to an inhibition hy-
pothesis, the N2 would be present for both intentional go
and intentional no-go trials, because the prepotent reac-
tive go response must be either completely or partially
suppressed before any intentional selection, whether it
Figure 2. (A) Grand average
waveforms for Experiment 1
(averages of Fz, FCz, and Cz
electrodes), time-locked to
onset of imperative target
stimulus. Dotted region
indicates the N2 component
selected for analysis. (B) Mean
(standard error) of N2
component in each condition.
(*p < .05, **p < .01,
***p < .001).
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involves the same action or not. That is, the brain termi-
nates the processing of the prepotent action when mak-
ing a choice, even when one of the choice options
involves making the same response voluntarily. This view
receives some support from the findings that simple RTs
are prolonged, compared to a baseline condition, if par-
ticipants first prepare to make an action intentionally but
then react to the imperative stimulus by making the same
response reactively (Obhi & Haggard, 2004). Further-
more, an irrelevant stop signal that does not actually re-
quire inhibition nevertheless produces slowed RTs and
inhibitory brain activity (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank, &
Poldrack, 2007).
Alternatively, the N2 component may reflect the com-
petition between several alternative responses. Because
the reactive go response was three times as frequent
(50%) as the other three conditions, any of those three
conditions may trigger a conflict between the prepotent
reactive go response and other alternatives. Notice that
both the inhibition and the conflict hypothesis imply that
intentional go responses are incompatible with reactive
go responses, but they differ in the supposed origin of
this incompatibility. The inhibition hypothesis treats the
incompatibility as a consequence of a fundamental and
exclusive competition between intention and reactivity,
whereas the conflict hypothesis views it as a by-product
of the frequencies of the different stimuli within the
experiment.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 therefore changed the relative proportions
of reactive go and no-go trials to distinguish between the
two hypotheses. Now, reactive go trials were 16%, and
reactive no-go trials were 50%, reversing the proportions
of Experiment 1. Free choice trials remained at 34%. Ac-
cording to the conflict hypothesis, the rare reactive go
trials should now cause the greatest N2, whereas the
most common reactive no-go trials should produce the
least. Importantly, response conflict in intentional trials
should remain as high as in Experiment 1.
Although itmight not be intuitive that a no-go response—
essentially a nonaction—can become a prepotent, pre-
pared response option, there is evidence that one can
in fact prepare a nonresponse. There is evidence that
the distinctive EEG readiness potential, usually observed
before a volitional action and associated with response
preparation, can also occur before voluntary muscle re-
laxation, indicating a “nonaction” can be prepared (Terada,
Ikeda, Yazawa, Nagamine, & Shibasaki, 1999; Terada,
Ikeda, & Shibasaki, 1995). Withholding a response in-
volves both pre-SMA and right inferior frontal gyrus in-
volvement (e.g., Aron, 2010). Intriguingly, both fMRI
and electrophysiological data have measured pre-SMA
and right inferior frontal gyrus activity when participants
are asked to prepare response withdrawal (Swann, Cai,
Conner, Pieters, & Michael, 2013). Moreover, there is
behavioral evidence that a no-go response can be as non-
consciously primed as the required response, leading
to subsequent RT deficits on a go trial (Parkinson &
Haggard, 2014; Hughes, Velmans, & De Fockert, 2009).
Thus, rather than merely being the absence of an action,
it seems that a no-go response can be a response in and
of itself, which can be internally and externally elicited
and prepared. In case of the current Experiment 2, it
does seem feasible that an abundant no-go response
might become prepotent, and ultimately may evoke re-
sponse conflict in reactive go and intentional trials, and
need to be suppressed to subsequently perform an
action.
Conversely, according to the motor inhibition hypoth-
esis, the lower frequency of reactive go trials should
make reactive go responses less prepotent and thus
greatly reduce the level of motor inhibition required to
make any other response. Therefore, the motor inhibi-
tion hypothesis predicts that the N2 component for the
reactive no-go, intentional go, and intentional no-go trials
should all be greatly reduced.
Results
Reactive go responses were slower than Experiment 1
(Experiment 2, mean = 399 msec, SD = 44.5; Experi-
ment 1, mean = 362.9 msec, SD = 26.2; t(1, 30) =
2.53, p = .017), confirming that we successfully manip-
ulated action prepotency. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants in Experiment 2 responded more rapidly on
reactive go trials (mean = 399 msec, SD = 44.5) than
on intentional go (mean = 409.1 msec, SD = 35.3;
t(15) = 6.05, p < .001). In Experiment 2, the mean rate
at which participants freely chose to act in intentional
trials was 56.1% (SD = 6.5). Mean miss rate was 3.4%
(SD = 3.4), and mean false alarm rate was 1.8% (SD =
1.5). An independent samples t test showed that false
alarm rates were significantly higher in Experiment 1
than Experiment 2 (t(30) = 4.66, p < .001). This sug-
gests that failures to inhibit in Experiment 2 were
fewer than in Experiment 1, which is further evidence
that the goal of reducing action prepotency in
Experiment 2 was achieved.
Experiment 2: N2 Mean Amplitude
ERPs from Experiment 2 clearly supported the inhibi-
tion hypothesis rather than the conflict hypothesis
(Figure 3A and B). ANOVA showed no significant main
effects of action source or response and no interaction
(all ps > .1; see Table 1). To provide further support for
null results in Experiment 2, we conducted a Bayes fac-
tor analysis on the three pertinent paired-samples com-
parisons upon which we based our conclusions in
Experiment 1. Bayes factor computations are increasing-
ly used as a statistical method of assessing the reliability
of null results (Dienes, 2014). We used an online Bayes
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factor calculator (www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_
Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm) to calculate Bayes factors
for each of the following ERP amplitude comparisons in Ex-
periment 2: reactive go versus reactive no-go; reactive go
versus intentional go; reactive go versus intentional no-go.
These were the tests that were highly significant in Exper-
iment 1, but nonsignificant in Experiment 2: For each of
these tests, we included an a priori expectation of the am-
plitude difference we might expect to see if the test was
significant, which we fixed at a value of 4 μV, a low round-
ing of the mean amplitude differences we saw in Experi-
ment 1. All three Bayes factors in Experiment 2 were
≤0.15, well below the sensitivity cutoff value of 0.333, sug-
gesting that the data support the null (Dienes, 2014).
Thus, in the absence of any strong prepotent drive to
act, the need for inhibition in reactive no-go trials was re-
duced, supporting the inhibition hypothesis. Interest-
ingly, intentional go and intentional no-go trials both
showed the same low N2 amplitude as the reactive go
and no-go conditions. In contrast, the conflict account
predicted a small N2 for the most frequent reactive no-go
trials and a large N2 for reactive go trials and all intentional
trials. Our data do not follow this pattern. The fact that
there is no difference in N2 amplitude between reactive
and intentional go trials suggests that intentional go re-
sponses are only incompatible with reactive go responses
when the latter are highly prepotent.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, ours is the first electrophysiological
study of intentional self-control of action. First, our re-
sults suggest that intentional action and intentional inhi-
bition are specific cognitive motor processes that can be
distinguished from their reactive counterparts. By in-
tegrating free choices to act or inhibit with the conven-
tional go/no-go task, we have been able to directly
compare the neural correlates of reactive and intentional
inhibition of action.
Our results showed two important differences be-
tween intentional action and reactive action, although
both classes of action were expressed through identical
keypresses. First, RTs were longer following a free choice
target stimulus than following a reactive go stimulus. If
intentional action merely involved internal triggering of
prepared reactive responses, one might expect similar
RTs in both situations. The additional delay could partly
reflect the time taken to choose between action and in-
hibition. In addition, the N2 component of the ERP to the
target stimulus was much larger for intentional actions
than for prepotent reactive actions (in Experiment 1),
consistent with a central processing difference. The RT
delay for free choices may be associated not only with
choosing which intentional response to make but also
with inhibiting previously prepared reactions. Importantly,
our participants’ intentional actions appeared unable to
take advantage of the previous preparation to react, al-
though the same motor output was required in both
cases. Intentional and reactive systems for action and inhi-
bition thus appeared to use different neural mechanisms,
with little sharing of activation between them.
Second, our study sheds light on the neural processes
linking instructions to motor responses, in particular, the
N2 ERP component. This component was previously sug-
gested to be specific to no-go responses (Bokura et al.,
2001; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Eimer, 1993; Pfefferbaum
Figure 3. (A) Grand average
waveforms for Experiment 2
(averages of Fz, FCz, and Cz
electrodes), time-locked to
onset of imperative target
stimulus. Dotted region
indicates the N2 component
selected for analysis. (B) Mean
(standard error) of N2
component in each condition.
(*p < .05, **p < .01,
***p < .001).
Table 1. Results of ANOVA on N2 Mean Amplitude in
Experiment 2
Effect df F p
Source (reactive/intentional) (1, 15) 0.119 .735
Response (go/no-go) (1, 15) 0.042 .840
Source × Response (1, 15) 0.113 .741
Parkinson and Haggard 1953
et al., 1985) and has been localized variously to ACC
and ventral and dorsolateral pFC (Gajewski, Stoerig, &
Falkenstein, 2008; Jonkman, Sniedt, & Kemner, 2007;
Bekker, Kenemans, & Verbaten, 2004; Lavric, Pizzagalli,
& Forstmeier, 2004; van Veen & Carter, 2002; Bokura
et al., 2001; Kiefer, Marzinzik, Weisbrod, Scherg, & Spitzer,
1998). However, previous studies could not distinguish
whether this component reflected inhibition of the go re-
sponse or rather a conflict between multiple alternative
responses. Our results clearly support the former hypothe-
sis, based on motor inhibition, rather than response con-
flict. We also show that this component is not specific to
no-go responses. The crucial step came frommixing a stan-
dard reactive go/no-go paradigm with intentional choices.
The conflict between intentional action and intentional
inhibition is identical to the putative conflict between re-
active go and reactive no-go. Therefore, conflict accounts
of the N2 would suggest no interaction between source of
action and go/no-go outcome in Experiment 1, yet a clear
interaction was nevertheless found. Furthermore, the high
RTs on intentional go trials were consistent with inhibition
of the prepotent reactive go response. Thus, N2 was in-
creased in all three conditions where there was behavioral
evidence for inhibition of the prepotent response: reactive
no-go, intentional go, and intentional no-go. Our results
clearly favor an inhibition over a conflict account.
The distinction between a medial system for internally
generated action and a lateral system for externally trig-
gered responding is well accepted (Passingham,Bengtsson,
& Lau, 2010). However, few studies have investigated how
these two systems may interact. Previous data suggest
that the two systems could be mutually inhibitory (Obhi
& Haggard, 2004), except perhaps in the very final period
before intentional action (Obhi, Matkovich, & Chen,
2009). This final period may correspond to activation of
the primary motor cortex (Haggard & Eimer, 1999), on
which both internal and external streams for action control
must ultimately converge (Sherrington, 1906). Our results
are consistentwith a fundamental distinctionbetween inten-
tional and reactive action and with an inhibitory link from
the intentional to the reactive motor circuit. To act for one-
self presupposes inhibition of ongoing stimulus-driven
activity. For example, our results indicated that intentional
control of action first required intentional inhibition of pre-
potent stimulus-driven impulse to act. Intentional inhibition
could therefore be a fundamental control mechanism for
volition in general and not just in inhibitory self-control. In-
terestingly, early cognitive models of supervisory attention
(Norman& Shallice, 1986) explicitly stated that willed action
required suppression of ongoing reactivity but specific evi-
dence of how this might be implement was lacking. Our
result provides a long-delayed empirical endorsement of
this crucial aspect of willed action.
On the basis of this inhibition model of intentional ac-
tion decisions, we can make some speculative hypothe-
ses for future research avenues. One main question to
ask is, what role, if any, do inhibitory processes have in
volitional decisions about action when there is no prepo-
tent motor action that requires suppression? So, for exam-
ple, what N2 effects would we see if we only presented
choice trials? Simply, we might expect replication of the
effects seen in Experiment 2, in which N2 amplitudes were
reduced overall, with no differences between them, as the
prepotency of the go response was greatly reduced. A sec-
ond question one might ask is, to what extent is the per-
ceptual effort of discriminating the different target stimuli
a factor in the RT cost in making an intentional choice and
therefore also in the pattern of N2 results we see? As in
many go/no-go paradigms, we use stimuli that are, to
some degree, similar to each other, in this case visual ar-
rows that have different directions. Previous research has
shown that, in go/no-go paradigms, the amplitude of the
N2 is dependent somewhat on the perceptual overlap be-
tween stimuli (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2004). So,
if we used different modalities, visual and auditory, for ex-
ample, between the reactive go/no-go and intentional tar-
gets, would this alter the pattern of N2 effects we see?
Such results might also allow us to further disambiguate
the roles of motor inhibition per se and those of other per-
ceptual conflict processes in volitional decisions.
One other interesting avenue for further research is to
ask what effects occur to inhibitory N2 EEG signals when
volitional choices are nonconsciously manipulated. In
Parkinson and Haggard (2014), as well as initially devel-
oping the go/no-go/choose paradigm, we also demon-
strated that RTs and, crucially, the intentional choices
themselves can be manipulated by nonconscious sublim-
inal priming: Facilitatory subliminal primes speeded reac-
tive and intentional go responses and also caused
participants to make the intentional go action more often,
whereas inhibitory primes slowed responses but also
made them more likely to choose to withhold the action.
Considering the results of the current paper, we can make
some predictions regarding an EEG replication of these
subliminal priming results: We suggest that the subliminal
primes exert nonconscious behavioral effects by modulat-
ing the internal inhibitory state of the motor system, which
should be indicated by appropriate changes in N2 ampli-
tude. Facilitatory primes should decrease motor inhibition,
thus decrease N2 amplitude and speed responses and in-
crease the volitional choice to act, whereas inhibitory
primes will produce the opposite effects. This might fur-
ther elucidate the role of motor inhibition specifically,
and motor systems more generally, in the generation of
endogenous volitional actions.
In conclusion, we have combined free selection to act
or inhibit with reactive go/no-go tasks in an ERP experi-
ment. Our results clearly suggest segregation between
the neural systems for internally generated action and for
responding to external stimuli, with inhibitory rather than
facilitatory interaction between the two systems. Our re-
sults also suggest that the intentional choice to act can in-
volve inhibition of a prepared motor response and that
this inhibition gives rise to the N2 ERP component. Our
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experiments also clarify the concept of intentional inhibi-
tion, as a specific system for intentionally inhibiting a re-
sponse one is about to make (Filevich et al., 2012), and a
key component of volition in general. To this extent, our
data are consistent with an endogenous system for brak-
ing prepotent motor action, which may be relevant for
self-control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). The human brain has
a unique capacity to disengage from stimulus-driven ac-
tion and to express endogenous action decisions. This
could be the neural mechanism underlying philosophical
concepts of “free will.” Even if an endogenous action deci-
sion takes the samemotoric form as an externally triggered
reaction, volitional inhibition must first stop the tendency
to react before any self-generated action can occur. In this
sense, society is clearly correct and appropriately aligned
with our neurocognitive capacities in allowing an important
distinction between deciding for oneself what to do and
merely obeying prepotent instructions (Milgram, 1963).
Our findings are consistent with these two classes of action
being psychologically quite distinct, even when they are
behaviorally indistinguishable.
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